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DECENTRALIZED STABILIZATION POLICIES:
OPTIMIZATION AND THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
BY FINNKYDLAND*
The main approach to the problem of decentralizedmacroeconomic policymaking in the lUerature so far
has been the so-called assignment problem, which isconcerned with how to pair economic instruments
with targets so as to insure stability of the economy. We arguethat a realistic model would be one in which
the policymakers all care about the same target variablesbut, because of different political pressures. they
assign relatively different weights to the various targets.We formulate a theory of decentralized
macroeconomic policymaking as a dynamic game between the monetaryand fiscal authorities and derive
equilibrium solutions for these games. Noncooperative solutions are discussed,and we also consider the
possibility that the fiscal authorities are dominant in the sense that they announcetheir decision first,
thereby raking into account the reaction function of the monetaryauthorities. The theory is applied to a
simple model of the U.S. economy, with particular attention to the questionof whether the solutions are
stable under various assumptions of the relative weights on the targets.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a lot of interest among economistsin the.probleni of
how to control policy instruments in an optimal way so as to achieveeconomic
stabilization.' In almost all of the work on this subject it is assumed that there is
only one decision maker, or at least that the preferences of thepolicymakers can
be reflected by a single objective function. However, in manycountries, the
instruments of the public sector are under the control of different policymakers
who may be under different political pressures and thus have conflicting views on
target values or the relative importance of these targets. Forinstance, in the
United States, it is unlikely that the fiscal and monetary authoritieshave the same
views on what the targets of their policies should be. It is not clear either thatmuch
cooperation is taking place between them.
The main approach to the problem of decentralized policymaking in the
literature so far has been what is commonly called the assignmentproblem.2 In
these models, which are mainly deterministic without lags in thestructural
equations, there are usually two policy controllers, each of whom has controlof a
particular instrument. Each controller is to vary his instrument in response to
changes in a single target variable which has been assigned to him. It is usually
assumed that he will vary his policy instrument at a rate proportional to the
deviation of the target variable from its target value. If the assignment is made
according to the criterion that each instrument should be directed towards that
target on which it has relatively the greatest impact, then it is shown thatthe target
values will be approached from any initial point. With the wrong assignment the
system becomes unstable in the sense of moving away from the target values.
* The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
'See for instance Chow [1, 2, 3,4], Pindyck [13, 141, and Prescott [15].
2See Mundell [11]. A list of some of the literature on this topic can be found in Whitman [23], as
well as in the recent article by Tsiang [22].
See Lancaster [9] for a discussion of the problems involved in generalizing to the n x n case.
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fact decentralized. Each policymaker clearly worriesabout more than onetarget
variable, and he is unlikely to just blindlycarry out some ad hoc policy rule
without regard to what the other policymaker is doing.A more realistic model for
such a situation seems to fall withina game-theoretic framework. In this paperwe
propose such a framework for the decentralized policy problem indynamic linear
economic models.
Each policy controller is assumed to minimizea loss function that may
include all the target variables, but supposedly withdifferent relative weights.
Each policymaker forms expectations of what theothers are going to do, and these
expectations will in equilibrium be rational in thesense that the expected
decisions turn out to be actual ones.
As an example we shall use a simple ad hocmodel of the U.S. economy. It will
be of a type nornially used to illustrate theassignment problem. The fiscal
authorities are assumed to control the netgovernment deficit, while the Federal
Reserve controls the interest rate. Onepossibility is to assunenoncooperative behavior, although casual observationsuggests that the relationship betweenthe two policymakers is such that the fiscalauthorities at certain intervalswill
announce their decision, while the Fed triesto do its best to meet its objectives,
given the announced fiscal policy. Inso doing, the fiscal authoritiescan take into
account the reaction function of the Fed. If thisis the case, the fiscalauthorities can be considered a dominant player.
For this model we run simulationsthat show how thetargets might be approached with two differentassumptions of the relative weightsthat the two
policymakers put on the targets. Oneof these examples compareswith the wrong assignment in the assignment problem.Unlike what is thecase there, our system is still stable in the sense that thetargets are approached fromany initial point, but speeds of adjustment towardsthe targets are significantlyslower than for the
"correct assignment." We alsoconsider a differentconcept of stability, namely
whether the decision rules willmove towards the equilibrium rules giventhat each policymaker initially has incompleteinformation about the policy ofthe other policymaker.
2. A NONCOOPERATIVEMODEL OF POLICYMAKING
The purpose of thisSection is to providean equilibrium framework for the selection of policies undernoncooperative behavior. For simplicityof notation we shall assume that the linearstructural equations of theeconomy can be written as
y, =g(y,1, Xft, x,,,, e1),
where x1, denotes theinstrument(s) under thecontrol of the fiscal authorities, and x,,, the instrument(s) controlledby the FederalReserve. The disturbancesr, are independently distributedover time with meatizero and finite variances. Also, assume that each pOlicymakerevaluates alternativepolicies according tosome preference (loss) functionthat can beapproximated by a quadratic function
IT ) (2.1) Elwi:(yi,xp,xni,)if,
1=1
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different objectiveS.The objective functions are written so asto include possible
dependence of the policymakerspreferences on the levels of the instruments or
changes thereof. Forinstance, one may perceive a certain Cost toinainhiluing the
rate of interest awayfrom some given level, or it may bethought costly in some
sense to let theinterest rate change a lot from oneperiod to another.
We see that each policymakerhas to know or assume something aboutthe
other policymaker's behaviorin order to solve his optimization problem.We
think of each player as selecting a sequenceof policy rules4 x1 ={x1( yt_i)}'=i, i=
f, m,given the rules for the otherplayer. In equilibrium we assume that each
policyinaker has rational expectationsabout the decisions of the other player.
This leads to the concept ofnoncooperative solution as a basis for a definition of
equilibrium for our model.
An appropriate solution or equilibrium concepthas been developed in
Kydland [7}. An equilibrium solution ischaracterized by two sequences of
functions, x{x(y,_)}i andx={x,,,(Yt_l)},'=l, where4minimizes (2.1) for
the fiscal authorities, given x, and x, minimizes(2.1) for the Fed, given 4. We
now outline how these solutions canbe computed.'
Define the functions
v11(y,_1)=E{w5(y, x,x)}, i= f,in;
that is, is the total value for policymaker i of the sequence of noncoopera-
tive solutions4 ={x(y_1)}=,. Then we can write
Vir(yz_i, x,)=mm E{w11(y, x) + v,+1(y,)}
subject to
= g(y,, x1,c)y, x, given.
Using the above notation, we can now define what we mean by equilibrium.
Definition: An equilibrium for each time period t=1.....T is a pair of
decision rules4=4(y,_) and x,i(y,_1)such that
mm E{w1[g(y,_1, x0, x, e,), x,, xj+ v,1[g(y,.1, x,,, x, E1)i}
xl'
C)0 0(h 0 1)
=E{w11[g(y,_ , x-1, x1s,), Xtr, xpj+ v1 ,1[g(y,i,x,, x,,, r)]}
i=f,m;fi.
The equilibrium solution has the characteristic that no policymaker has any
incentive to change his decision rule in any period, given the decision rules of the
other policymaker.
4The state vector can be expandedin awell-known way so asto include, for instance,lagged
decision variables.
Also called Nash equilibrium [12].Discussionsof Nashequilibriaindifferential gamescan be
found in Starr andHo[19, 20]
6The computational detailsfor the linear-quadraticcaseare given in161and [7], and computer
programs are listed in [6], andcanbe provided upon request.
251The equilibriumdecision rules can be computed using backward induction.
At time z the first-order conditions for a minimum7 for each of the two policy-
makers, define two mappings
Y:-t X1-X1, = f,in;
In equilibrium these solutions can be written
() 0 x,Xr(Yc-i).
Given these solutions we can now evaluate the value functions at timetas
v,(y1_1)= V[y1_1, x(y11)],i=f,in;ji.
The solution concept outlined above is a feedback solution. However, unlike
the case of only one decision maker, this solution is not the same as the open ioop
solution, where the decisions are sequences of functions of the initial yo and of all
previously observed random variables, that is,
= x,,(y0, ,.. . ,r1_I),t = 1.....T; If, ni.
This difference, which is explained in detail in [7], would occur even in the absence
of uncertainty. Intuitively, the reason is the following. In making his decision,
policymaker i knows that his decision will affect the state variables. A change in
the state variables will change the other policymaker's decisions in the future and
affect future losses for policymaker i. This fact is taken into account in the
feedback solution when policymaker i makes his decision. Of course, both types
of solutions represent equilibrium solutions in some sense. However, the feature
described above seems to lend more realism to the feedback solution as a
description of the movement of an economic system.
The argument for the feedback solution as the appropriate equilibrium
concept seems even more convincing when the planning horizon is infinite. In this
case we take the objective functions of the policymakers to be
(2.2) E{f3w1(y,,Xfr,xrn:)} ii,m,
where 0<,J3,,,<1 are discount factors. We are here looking for stationary
solutions, that is, an equilibrium characterized by two functions x°=x(y,_1) and
X°m'x2(y1i). They are equilibrium decisions if x minimizes (2.2) for the fiscal
authorities, given x,, while x,, minimizes (2.2) for the Fed, given x. For the case
in which w1(), I=f,in, are quadratic and the constraints linear with additive
disturbances, the method of successive approximations has been found to work
effective' in computing the solutions. One solves a T-period problem to deter-
minet41(yo) and v(y0), the first-period value functions for the truncated
T-period problem. These value functions are then used to determine the same
functions for the T+ 1 period problem. These functions have been found to
converge quickly to some limiting functions v1(y_1) and v(y_i) satisfying the
respective functional equations for the two policymakers.8 These functions, then,
imply a pair of equilibrium solutions for the infinite-period game.
We assume that the secondorder conditions are satisfied as well.




In the open loop formulationwe could also let Tgo to infinity,in which case the firsr-period decision rules wouldsettle down to some stationaryrules as functions of the initial state variables. Itis interesting to note that ifone of the players wet e to take this open loop decisionrule for the other playeras given and solve his one-player infinite horizonproblem (which would bea standard control
problem), his optimal stationary decisionrule would not be thesame as the one given by the open loop solution. Onthe other hand, it is obvious that,if instead he
takes the feedback rule of the otherplayer as given and solves hisown one-player
problem, he will get back his feedbackrule as the optimalone for his one-player
problem. These commentssuggest that players groping for equilibriumdecision rules which imply no incentiveto change their rules, are likelyto end up with
feedback rules instead of open loopsolutions.
3. A DOMINANT PLAYER MODELOF POLICYMAKING
In this section we stress only the maindepartures from the analysis of Section
2. We assume that the fiscal authoritiesare dominant in that they can make their
decision first, thereby taking intoaccount the reaction function of themonetary
authorities,9An equilibrium solution is then characterizedby two sequences of
functions, x = {x(v)}1 andx, = (x(y,_1, x1,)}1.
As before we define value functionsVit(yt_i) and v,,(y,_1) that represent the
total values for the two policymakers ofthe two sequences of equilibrium
solutions {x(y_t)},and{x(y,_1,4(y5_i))},. These value functions willnow
be helpful in indicating how the equilibriumsolutions can be determined by
backward induction.
Define for period t
(3.1) Vmr(y:_I,xft)minE{W,ffl(yr,Xz)±Vmr+I(y,)}
subject to
= g(y,1,x1, a), y_1,xj given.
The solution for the Federal Reserve is of the form
0 0 Xmt'X,(}'1_1,x11).
Taking account of this, the problem for the fiscal authoritiescan now be
written




Solutions of models with a dominant player are often called Stackelbergsolutions [18]. Such
solutions have been considered in the context of differentialgames by Sirnaan and Cruz [16, 17].
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The equilibrium solution is of theform
x=x(y,),
which, when substituted into (3. 1)gives
v,,,(y1- i) = V,,IJyIi,
The solution just described is thefeedback solution. As in the noncoopera-
tive case this solution is not the same asthe open loop solution which can be
written on the form
X1, =X,n(Y, Xj,.... Xp, E1
,E_i), t I 1.
As has been shown in [7] and [171the open loop solution iii general is such that it is
not optimal for the players to carrythrough with their plans. This means that if the
players make the decisions givenby x1, i =f, m, then the original plan
xjt(yu, El r,). I = 2 T, for the fiscal authorities is no longer optimal for
the reniaining T-- 1 periods of the horizon.This would be the case even in the
absence of uncertainty. In equilibrium one must assumethat the players will
foresee this, and the feedback solutionwill then he the appropriate equilibrium
10 concept.
The extension to an infinite horizonproblem goes along the same lines as
indicated in Section 2. Both for thenoncooperative and dominant player case one
can compute the covariancematrix for the stationary solution ii the covariance
matrix for the disturbances is known. Thecomputations are similar for both cases
and are outlined in [7].
4. A MoDEl. OF TIlEU.S. ECONOMY
To illustrate the theory of the previous twosections we shall use a simple
model adapted from one reported in McFadden [10]. it is similar to someof the
models used in the literature on the assignment problem, exceptthat we are
introducing lags to make the model dynamic.
The variables we use are the following:
Y=domestic U.S. production,
X = U.S. aggregate expenditure,
C-= U.S. aggregate consumption,
S = U.S. aggregate saving,
IU.S. domestic investment,
M = U.S. imports of foreign goods and services,
K = net capital outflows from the U.S.,
T = taxes net of transfers,
G = U.S. government expenditures for goods and services,
B = U.S. surplus in international balance of payments,
E = U.S. export of goods and services, assumed constant,
D = G -- T= net government deficit.
A more thorough discussion of this issue can he found in Kydland [7.].
254All the variables above are annual rates, and are measured in billionsof dollars,
deflated to a uniform price level. In addition we have
r = U.S. domestic interest rate, measured in percent.
The following identities link the variables:
Y= C+S+7
X = C + I + G + K,
B = E - M - K,
B= YX
The assumed behavioral relations aret1:











To complete our example we have to make some assumptions about the loss
functions of the two policymakers. The Federal Reserve, having control over the
interest rate, is assumed to put relatively niore weight on balance of payments
equilibrium,'2 while the main target of the fiscal authorities is full employment
GNP. We also assume that each policymaker perceives an increasing cost to
changing the instruments from one period to another.
With these assumptions, the one-period loss functions are initially taken to
be:
w1 = 10B2-f 0.01(Y-580)2+ I .7(rr_1)2+0.02(D D_1)2,
w7O.5B+0.02(Y-580)-t-O.3(rr 1)2+O.1(D D_,)2.
Without any difficulty we could have included cross-product terms for the
targets, and we could also have assumed that the desired target values were
different for each controller. As it is, each policymaker would prefer B = 0 and
Y = 580. We also note that, although each policymaker has no direct control over
the other policymaker's instrument, he still perceives some loss associated with
changes in that instrument. Of course, each policymaker can only affect the other
''The relations of the original model by McFadden [10] were adapted froman econometric
model and modified to approximate the 1963 U.S. national accounts. Some of the figures for that year
were: E=32, 1=83, C=353, M=26.5, G= 109, T= 100, and S98.
12Comments made in Tobin [21] regarding macroeconomic policymaking in the 1960s seem to
confirm the realism of this assumption.
255policymaker's instrument through the effect of his own decision ruk on the other's
decision rule.
We shall first compute the deterministic time paths of the state variables and
instruments assuming that they initially have the values'3 B0 = 2, Y0 = 551, r0 =
8, and D0 = 9. The horizon is assumed to be long enough so that increasing it by
one period does not change any of the coefficientsof the first-period decision rules
to the sixth significant digit. Typically this would mean a horizon of about 20
periods, and these decision rules should be very close to the stationary ones for the
infinite horizon model. The discount factor is 0.95 for both policymakers. For easy
reference we refer to noncooperative solutions by NC and dominant player
solutions by DP. The solutions for the objective functions above will thus be
referred to by NC1 and DPi.
The time paths of B and Y for the noncooperative solutions are shown in
Figure 1. As an illustration we also show the tune path for Y in the dominant
player solution.
The values of the losses for the whole horizon are slightly lower for DPi
than NCI for both policymakers. The reduction is about 3.5 percent for the fiscal
authorities. It may seem surprising, then, that the curve foryD'is strictly below
the curve foryNCI,even though the fiscal authorities, who have Y as their main
target, are dominant and manage to reduce their loss compared to the non-
cooperative solution. The explanation cannot be seen in the figures, but can easily
be understood by looking at the paths for D. By being dominant the fiscal
authorities manage to use their instrument more effectively and the reduced
changes in D required in each period more than make up for the longer distance of
Y from the target value in every period.
According to the criterion for assigning instruments to targets the interest
rate r should be assigned to B, because that is where it has relatively the stronger
impact. Similarly, D should be assigned to Y. if the opposite assignment is made,
then the system will be unstable. In the model just described the instruments are
assigned according to the assignment criterion in the sense that each policymaker
puts relatively more weight on the target on which his instrument has relatively the
stronger impact.
We shall now see what happens if this is not the case. Specifically, we assume
that, relative to the targets, the Fed now has the loss function the fiscal authorities
had previously, while the fiscal authorities have the one the Fed had. The new loss
functions are then:
w1 = 0.5B2+0.02(Y580)2 + 1 .7(r r1)2 + 0.02(D-D_1)2,
w2 = 10B2+0.01(Y 580)2+0.3(r r1)2+0.1(D--D_1)2.
The new equilibrium solutions arc referred to as NC2 and DP2. In order that
comparisons with NCI and DPi be meaningful, care was taken when choosing the
weights of the original objective functions to insure that the total losses for NC1
and DPi would be approximately equal for both the monetary and fiscal
These are approximately the actual values for 1963.
256authorities, and that thecontribution to the losses due to changesin the control variables amounted toapproximately the samepercentage of the total loss for each policyrnaker.
The time paths of the solutionsfrom NC2, starting from thesame point as before, are shown in Figure1. While in the assignmentproblem the wrong
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Figure 1Time paths of target variables
257So far we have assumed that the model is deterministic, and we studied how
the targets might be approached under two different assumptions about the loss
functions. However, it is clearly more realistic to think of the behavioral relations
as including stochastic errors,which will make the target values attainable onlyon
the average. An interesting exercise, then, is to compute the covariance matrices
of the stationary solutions. We shall compare NCI with NC2, although the results
of a comparison between DPi and DP2 are similar.
Assume for simplicity that we have found the covariance matrix for the errors
of the reduced form to be
210.250
We denote the variances for B and Y in the stationary solutions by o-and .,
respectively. Given the assumed covariance matrix for the error terms, we find
that NCI results in=0.252tT and r.= l.261u, while for NC2 weget
= 0.2540.2 and U'y2.8l7ff. We thus see that the variance of Y has increased
substantially when the policymakers put relatively more weight on the "wrong"
targets. One should also note that the increased variability of Y is not compen-
sated by a lower variability of D as was the case when comparing NC1 with DPI.
Here we also get a substantial increase of o-, from 0.158 to 0.276.
6. A FURTHER LOOK AT STABILITY
In the previous section we talked about stability in the sense in which it is
normally used in the literature on the assignment problem, namely referringto
whether the target variables will move towards the target values or not. However,
a more interesting concept of stability is the question of whether the decision rules
will have a tendency to move towards the equilibrium decision rules.
For the noncooperative case, assume that the monetary authorities initially
think that the fiscal authorities are following some decision rule d)(y_1). Taking
this as given, they derive their own optimal decision rule, say d,,1(y_1). However,
the monetary authorities will soon realize that the fiscal authoritiesuse some other
policy rule, say d1,1(y), and revise their expectations for the future. Similarly,as
the monetary authorities revise their decision rules, the fiscal authoritieswill
revise their expectations.
Define one iteration to include one successive modification byeach
policymaker. Assume that the changes in expectations from iterationn to a + 1
follow the following adaptive schemes:
df1(y_ ) = d(y_1)+AJd1(y1) d(y i)],i=f, m,
where 0< X s 1. The special case ofA= 1 corresponds to static expectations in the
sense that each policymaker believes that the otherone will continue to behave in
the future according to the mostrecent decision rule.
In Tables 1 and 2 some computationalresults are shown with A1 for NCI
and NC2, respectively. Only themonetary policies, which are of the form
r, = d1B1 +d2y_1 +d3r,1+d4D1
258are shown, although similar results arc obtained for the fiscal rules. The first
monetary policy rule is obtained assuming that the fiscal rule is simply D1=
The fiscal rule for the first iteration is then obtained, taking as given the monetary
rule from the first iteration, and so on. The equilibrium decision rules are listed at
the end of each table. The decision rules for NCI converge quickly to these
equilibrium rules, indicating that the equilibrium decisions of Section 5 are quite
stable. The rules from NC2 also converge, indicating that they are stable as well,
but the rate of convergence is substantially lower.
TABLE 1
MONETARY POLICIES FOR NC1
Coefficient of
TABLE 2
MONETARY POLICIES FOR NC2
Coefficient of
Similar results could have been obtained for the dominant player solutions.
The only difference would have been that the monetary policy at each iteration
had the form dm(y_i, xj), where x1 denotes the fiscal control variable.
7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In summary, we have proposed a new game-theoretic approachto the
problem of decentralized policymaking. We have presenteda positive theory for
how the policymakers may act optimally, given expectations of what the other
policyrnakers will do. The possibility of one policymaker being dominantwas
studied. Among the potential applications we here chose to formulatea model
related to the assignment problem, but basedon what we think are more realistic
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Iteration
No. B_1 D_1 constant
1 -0.003820.02239 0.1483 0.1864 -8.093
2 0.055750.01350 0.3565 0.06117 -0.4265
3 0.072230.00990 0.5419 0.04374 -0.4841
4 0.060700.00902 0.5686 0.03222 0.1382
5 0.058490.00830 0.6030 0.02815 0.1976
0.05361 0.00749 0.6214 0.0245 I 0.5405
Iteration
No. B1 Y. D. constant
1 --0.1503 0.03613-0.079370.1692 -11.64
2 -0.2066 0.02752 O.0616()0.1014 -5.739
3 -0.2218 0.02532 0097930.08199 -4.137
4 -0.2256 0.02490 0.1057 0.07628 -3.752
5 -0.2265 0.02484 0.1071 0.07460 -3.663
-0.2268 0.02485 0.1072 0.07389 -3.635I
assumptions. Our conclusions turn out to besornewhat different, in particular with
regard to stability.
Alternatively, the framework presented could have aimed at studying
decentralized policies in a model where the policymakers put different weights o
such targets as inflation and unemployment. Most models presented so far, which
are mostly normative, assume a singlepreference function and perfect coordina-
tion of the instruments.'4 Our framework might also be used to shed some light on
the controversy over rules versus discretion, in particular with regard to monetary
policy. The advantage of our framework is that we can take account of the fact that
if fiscal policymakers behave rationally, their decision rules will not remain stable
when the monetary rule changes.'5 We do make the assumption that the decision
rules of the rest of the economy remain stable. This is done in order to enable us to
concentrate on the interaction between the two policymakers. However, in other
models one may also wish to take into account the fact that economic agents, if
they behave rationally, will change their decision rules if certain policy rules
change.
Norwegian School of &onomics
and Business Administration
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